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Dr Marcus Teo states that my claim that prospective parents have a moral obligation to have genetically related children is invalid because I have ignored the non-identity problem. He maintains that donor-conceived persons (DCPs) cannot be harmed by their conception, as they would not exist otherwise. However, an analysis of his argument shows that the reason why he does not recognise such moral obligation is not the non-identity problem but his rejection of the Principle of Procreative Beneficence. He instead adopts a ‘minimal threshold’ principle: as long as a child’s life is worth living, there is no obligation to select the child with the best possible life.Teo also claims that my article may cause unnecessary anxiety in parents. However, these concerns have mostly been raised by psychological professionals who have highlighted the complexities of donor conception. Nevertheless, to address these concerns, the original claim could be refined into an ‘all-things-considered’ moral obligation, which would acknowledge more explicitly that it can be overridden by stronger moral reasons.Talbot et al state that my conclusion regarding the future well-being of DCPs is premature and based on selective evidence. However, their literature review does not contradict my claim that a substantial number of DCPs experience negative psychosocial effects. Societal trends such as ancestry testing and increasing focus on genetic ties may worsen these outcomes in the future.